T he information technology (IT) governance literature predominantly explains firms' IT governance choices, but not their strategic consequences. We develop the idea that a firm's IT governance choices induce adeptness at strategically exploiting IT only when they are discriminatingly aligned with its departments' knowledge outside their specialty. Discriminating means that governing the two undertheorized classes of IT assets-apps and infrastructure-requires "peripheral" knowledge in different departments. Analyses of data from 105 firms support our middle-range theory.
Introduction
Citibank was the first to introduce an iPhone app that let customers cash a check by uploading its image to Citibank's servers. The innovation created unprecedented convenience for its customers and reduced both the fees that Citibank paid to out-of-network ATMs and its need for new ATMs. Yet, like many information technology (IT) innovations, rivals soon copied it. Citibank was unsurprised, for it had learned to expect that since betting $100 million in 1977 to introduce ATMs into its industry. By seizing an opportunity to differentiate itself and reduce costs, Citibank created a temporary advantage over its rivals. Its competitive weapon was not its IT, but its agility to use IT to consistently create a series of temporary advantages, introducing a new one before rivals could even finish copying the last one. Such strategic IT agility is not unique to banking. Firms such as Zara, Delta Air Lines, and UPS are the Citibanks of their industries: consistently using IT to strategically outdistance rivals, who are constantly playing second fiddle. Why are some firms more adept at using IT in their pursuit of strategic opportunities?
As IT grows into firms' largest capital expense, they increasingly demand-and expect-IT to be strategically responsive yet economical (Brynjolfsson and Schrage 2009, Feld and Stoddard 2004) . IT is "expected to perform miracles," as Heller (2012, p. 33) laments. These conflicting demands appear hard to reconcile until we weigh the idea in the practitioner literature that different types of IT assets must be governed differently Weill 2007, Xue et al. 2008 ). The distinction between two broad "classes" of IT assets-IT apps and IT infrastructure-widespread in the IT practitioner literature exists primarily as a powerful descriptive taxonomy whose theoretical properties have remained underdeveloped (e.g., Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002 , Ross 2002 , Weill and Ross 2005 .
The belief is that the secret sauce for exploiting IT for strategic agility is how it is governed, i.e., which department makes what IT decisions (Heller 2012, p. 3; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 14) . That implies that some IT decisions not be made by the IT unit (Ross 2002) . Pundits therefore urge IT and line functions to learn to speak each other's language (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 68) , a suggestion that is at odds with the specialization needed for functional division of labor within a firm. Paradoxically, departmental specialization breeds ignorance, yet such ignorance is precisely what permits departmental specialization. A marketing department making IT decisions sounds as unrealistic as IT making branding or advertising decisions. After all, functions specialize in different activities (Alonso et al. 2008) . A middle ground might be selectively reducing cross-departmental ignorance, where one function speaks the other's language but not vice versa.
However, the IT governance literature, preoccupied with explaining IT governance centralization and decentralization choices (e.g., Magill 1994, 1998; Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) , has yet to explore when which department must speak the other's language or its interplay with a firm's IT governance choices. (We refer to one department's knowledge in the other's domain but outside its own as peripheral knowledge; Tiwana and Keil 2007.) Thus, although we have considerable insight into the broad drivers of firms' IT governance choices, these insights are not cumulative because prior studies inconsistently use IT governance to refer to just one class of IT decisions (e.g., Brown and Magill 1998 , Brown 1997 , Olson and Chervany 1980 or both lumped together (Lewis and Byrd 2003 , Ross 2002 , Tiwana and Konsynski 2010 , Weill et al. 2002 , Xue et al. 2011 . In summary, we know little about how the nuanced interplay between a firm's IT governance choices and the IT unit's and line functions' peripheral knowledge shapes IT strategic agility. Which department has peripheral knowledge might have value depending on which department makes what IT decisions. Put differently, the alignment between the IT unit's and line functions' peripheral knowledge and classes of governed IT assets must be more nuanced, or "discriminating." Failing this, firms risk either making strategically numb IT investments or diluting departmental specialization. This study addresses this gap guided by the following research question: How does the interplay between firms' IT governance choices and departmental peripheral knowledge influence IT strategic agility?
We theoretically develop the idea that IT governance amplifies firms' IT strategic agility only when it is "discriminatingly" aligned with the IT unit's and line functions' peripheral knowledge. To develop the discrimination idea, we disaggregate IT governance into two classes (apps and infrastructure) and peripheral knowledge into two types (IT unit's business knowledge and line functions' technical knowledge). Using the work of Jensen and Meckling (1992) (JM) as a springboard for our middle-range theory, we use the same theoretical apparatus for both classes of governed IT. We theorize that greater technical knowledge in line functions but greater business knowledge in the IT unit respectively increase returns to agility from IT app and IT infrastructure governance. Our recognition of the endogenous nature of IT governance permits cumulativeness with the vast literature on IT governance choice without making any normative assertions.
Econometric tests using matched-pair data from 105 firms provide considerable support for the proposed ideas.
Our distinctive contribution is a middle-range theory of how firms' IT strategic agility is predicated in a discriminating alignment of their IT governance choices and their departments' peripheral knowledge. The department whose peripheral knowledge enhances such agility depends on how the firm governs its IT apps and IT infrastructure. Subsequent sections theoretically develop these ideas ( §2); describe the methodology ( §3), analyses, and results ( §4); and discuss our contributions and implications ( §5).
Theoretical Development
Our research model in Figure 1 predicts IT strategic agility (construct definitions in Table 1 ). We define IT strategic agility as the degree to which the IT unit furthers a firm's pursuit of strategic business opportunities, building on prior IT governance studies' emphasis on firms' strategic use of IT (Segars and Grover 1998) , IT agility (Lu and Ramamurthy 2011 , Sambamurthy et al. 2003 , Tiwana and Konsynski 2010 , and using IT to exploit business opportunities Magill 1998, Hann and Weber 1996) . This conceptualization represents an outcome manifested in firm-level ITrelated actions rather than a capability. The overarching idea in the model is that IT strategic agility is explained by a nuanced interplay between which department makes what IT decisions and which department has knowledge outside its own domain.
Our model does not assume any normatively ideal IT governance structure. Instead, we recognize that a firm's IT governance choices are endogenously driven by (i) already-known strategic, internal, and external drivers of IT governance choices; (ii) the IT unit's prior track record; and (iii) internal and external knowledge integration mechanisms already in place. Our model therefore uses a firm's IT governance choices as predicted by these factors, departing from its historically Baschab and Piot (2003, p. 81) , Brown and Magill (1998) , Hann and Weber (1996) , Lewis and Byrd (2003) , Tiwana and Konsynski (2010) 
IT infrastructure governance centralization
Degree to which decision rights for IT infrastructure lean toward the IT unit vis-à-vis the line functions Endogenous predictor Brown and Magill (1998) , Hann and Weber (1996) , Star and Ruhleder (1996) , Tiwana and Konsynski (2010) Hann and Weber (1996) Cross-unit IT synergy Degree to which substantial benefits can potentially be realized by centrally coordinating IT activities across the firm Instrument Brown and Magill (1998) , Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) 
IT formalization
Degree to which the work of the IT unit is codified into formalized procedures
Instrument Ranganathan and Sethi (2002)

External knowledge integration
Degree to which knowledge from outside the firm is actively utilized in the firm's IT activities Mitchell (2006) , Reich and Benbasat (2000) 
Instrument
Internal knowledge integration
Degree to which knowledge dispersed in the line and IT functions is jointly utilized in the firm's IT activities Mitchell (2006) IT unit performance Degree to which the IT unit met line functions' needs Instrument Nelson and Cooprider (1996) exogenous treatment (e.g., Tiwana and Konsynski 2010; Xue et al. 2008 Xue et al. , 2011 Jensen and Meckling's (1992) theory, the crux of which is that decision rights must be colocated with the knowledge needed to make those decisions. A decision right specifies who in a firm has the authority to make what decisions (Nault 1998) . When the two are not colocated, either (a) decision rights must be moved to the department where the relevant knowledge resides (JM's "delegation" solution following Alonso et al. 2008) or (b) the relevant knowledge must be moved to the locus of decision rights (JM's "transmission" solution). Figure 2 (a) illustrates these two solutions, which Jensen and Meckling (1992) view as alternative choices.
Instrument
We conceptualize IT governance as comprising two "classes" of IT decisions, IT apps and IT infrastructure, building on the notion of IT governance structure 1 We follow knowledge-based theories in assuming that IT and line functions have deep knowledge of their own domains (Baldwin 2008, p. 166; Becker and Murphy 1992) .
as the specification of IT decision rights (Brown and Magill 1998 , Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999 , Tiwana and Konsynski 2010 . A firm can locate an IT decision right anywhere along the continuum between centralization with the IT unit or decentralization to the line functions (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 59) .
2
The problem with either JM solution-delegation or transmission-is the assumption that there exists one department with the entirety of decision-relevant knowledge (Demsetz 1992 ). This assumption is often violated in IT decisions; effective IT decisions simultaneously require both line functions' business knowledge and the IT unit's technical knowledge (Mitchell 2006, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . Therefore, both centralization and decentralization will always fail to colocate some necessary knowledge with IT decision rights. JM's delegation solution then requires tandem recourse to JM's transmission solution, i.e., moving the separated knowledge to the decision rights-holding department. The focus in our conceptualization of governance as decision rights is on IT decisions rather than IT activities, following Aghion and Tirole (1997) . Our conceptualization mirrors Alonso et al. (2008) , where decentralized (centralized) governance entails decision rights allocated primarily to line functions (the IT unit). firm chooses either JM's delegation solution or transmission solution, it must use both the delegation solution and the transmission solution in Figure 2 (b) when knowledge is dispersed across departments. The challenge in realizing JM's transmission solution is that IT and line functions speak different languages by virtue of departmental specialization (Ross 2002; Star and Ruhleder 1996; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 68) . A Wall Street Journal article called this "a glass wall" (Basu 2008) . The delays in one understanding the other can imperil IT strategic agility. Swiftly building consensus between them requires one department to be able to converse in the language of the decisionrights-holding department (Bucciarelli 1994, p. 148) . Then, increasing one department's knowledge in the other department's domain but outside its own (hence, "peripheral knowledge"; Tiwana and Keil 2007) eases communication by allowing it to speak more of the other's language (Faraj and Xiao 2006) . 3 Such peripheral knowledge, however, violates the spirit of departmental specialization (Garicano 2000) , making it important to know when its substantial upfront costs are commensurate with its benefits in facilitating JM's transmission solution.
Discriminating Alignment
Discriminating alignment refers to the nuanced alignment between which department makes what IT decisions and which department has peripheral knowledge. It is discriminating because a specific department's peripheral knowledge is valuable only for a specific class of IT decisions but not the other. Table 2 summarizes our discriminating alignment logic for IT app governance ( §2.2.1) and IT infrastructure governance ( §2.2.2).
We first theorize which department JM's delegation solution nudges decision rights toward, recognizing that IT apps and infrastructure require different types of knowledge (Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003, p. 200) . Capitalizing on emergent opportunities demands speed (McGrath 2013, p. 12) ; increasing a firm's IT strategic agility therefore requires minimizing the delays from knowledge transfers between IT and line functions (Jensen and Meckling 1992, p. 254) .
Decision rights should be allocated to the best informed department, regardless of the need for coordination (Alonso et al. 2008, p. 162 ). JM's delegation solution, i.e., shifting them toward the locus of the knowledge on which that class of IT decisions primarily draws (k a in Figure 2 (b)) accelerates IT decisions by minimizing such delays (Bester and Krähmer 2008) . 4 To apply the now-separated complementary knowledge (k b ) to those decisions, the firm must then-in tandem-use JM's transmission solution. This is where discriminating alignment comes in. Increasing peripheral knowledge in the department that has lesser authority over a class of IT decisions facilitates JM's transmission solution.
Our conceptual separation of both (a) IT app from IT infrastructure governance and (b) two types of peripheral knowledge is theoretically significant. First, prior studies use the term IT governance to refer to three conceptually different things: (i) IT apps (Brown and Magill 1998 , Brown 1997 , Olson and Chervany 1980 , (ii) IT infrastructure (Xue et al. 2011) , and (iii) both lumped together (e.g., Hann and Weber 1996 , Lewis and Byrd 2003 , Tiwana and Konsynski 2010 , Weill et al. 2002 . By contrast, we use the apps versus infrastructure demarcation in the practitioner literature as a stepping stone to develop their underdeveloped theoretical properties (e.g., Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002 , Ross 2002 , Weill and Ross 2005 . Similarly, separating the two peripheral knowledge types departs from an isomorphic notion of "shared knowledge" that assumes away asymmetry in departmental knowledge overlaps (e.g., Nelson and Cooprider 1996, Reich and Benbasat 2000) . IT app governance refers to how decision rights for IT apps are divvied between the line functions and the IT unit.
5 IT apps are often uniquely tailored to various line functions, and thus draw primarily on knowledge of line functions' specialized activities, business processes, and problems (Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002 , Ross 2002 , Weill and Ross 2005 . Since such knowledge-by virtue of departmental specialization-is concentrated in the line functions (Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003, p. 201) , agility-imperiling delays can be minimized using JM's delegation solution, i.e., by shifting app decision rights toward line functions. By contrast, centralizing IT app decision rights would impede strategic agility by requiring time-consuming business knowledge transfer from various line functions to the IT unit (Athey and Roberts 2001) .
However, IT app decisions must also be cognizant of firmwide technical constraints and integration with the firm's existing IT assets (Basu 2008; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 147) , of which the IT unit likely is more knowledgeable. Otherwise, app decisions risk being oblivious to technical constraints (Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003, p. 63) , leading to agility-impeding iteration and rework. The IT unit's inability to swiftly and comprehensibly communicate such knowledge to line functions can then impede IT strategic agility. App governance decentralization alone will not enhance IT strategic agility unless this knowledge separation is overcome. This requires the IT unit to contribute its technical knowledge as an input into IT app decisions, i.e., a recourse to JM's transmission solution. (Weill and Ross 2004, p. 54 , call these "decision right inputs.") However, the linguistic chasm between IT and line functions makes it challenging for the IT unit to communicate its technical knowledge in a form that the line 5 IT applications ("apps") are business analysis and transaction systems that the firm's individual line functions use for their core activities and functional business processes (Baschab and Piot 2003) . They include customer-facing apps, production support apps (e.g., supply chain, logistics, inventory, warehousing), and business support apps (e.g., accounting and payroll; Baschab and Piot 2003, p. 81; Weill and Ross 2005) . Many prior studies subsume IT apps under an all-encompassing definition of IT infrastructure (e.g., Lewis and Byrd 2003, Weill et al. 2002) .
functions can readily use in making app decisions (Feld and Stoddard 2004) . The solution then is increasing the IT unit's business knowledge, which allows it to provide inputs in a language that line functions can more readily understand and apply in making app decisions. Simply increasing line functions' technical knowledge alone would not substitute for the IT unit's peripheral knowledge because line functions are less likely to possess the IT unit's holistic knowledge of the firmwide IT portfolio with which an app must eventually interoperate. Therefore, IT app governance decentralization will enhance IT strategic agility only in combination with greater business knowledge in the IT unit. Increasing one increases the marginal returns of the other. This represents discriminating alignment between IT app governance and peripheral knowledge, which leads to our first discriminating alignment hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). An increase in IT unit business knowledge increases the marginal returns to IT strategic agility from decentralizing IT app governance.
Discriminating Alignment Between IT Infrastructure Governance and Peripheral Knowledge.
IT infrastructure governance refers to how decision rights for IT infrastructure decisions are divvied between the line functions and IT unit.
6 Firmwide interoperability, security, and scale economies are critical in provisioning IT infrastructure because it provides a firmwide foundation shared by various line functions' IT apps (Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 35; Xue et al. 2011) . IT infrastructure decisions therefore require deep technical expertise as well as a holistic understanding of the firm's IT assets. Since such knowledge-by virtue of departmental specialization-is concentrated in the IT unit, 6 A firm's IT infrastructure represents a foundation needed to run IT apps, or a substrate that knits together various IT apps (Feld and Stoddard 2004 , Lewis and Byrd 2003 , Mitchell 2006 , Sambamurthy et al. 2003 , Weill and Ross 2005 . IT infrastructure encompasses digital communication and networks (e.g., email, Internet access), data management, IT operations and maintenance, IT procurement (e.g., hardware), and IT support (Baschab and Piot 2003, p. x; Weill et al. 2002) . IT infrastructure therefore serves the entire firm and is not unique to individual line functions.
agility-impeding delays can be minimized using JM's delegation solution, i.e., by shifting IT infrastructure decision rights toward the IT unit. This represents centralization of IT infrastructure governance. By contrast, decentralizing IT infrastructure decision rights impedes IT strategic agility due to knowledge transfer delays. Furthermore, piecemeal infrastructure decisions by myriad line functions can exacerbate IT infrastructure complexity, making apps progressively more time consuming to implement.
However, IT infrastructure decisions must also be made in cognizance of myriad line functions' varied IT needs (Andersson et al. 2012, Star and Ruhleder 1996) , which the line functions likely know better themselves. Line functions' inability to swiftly and comprehensibly communicate their needs and priorities to the IT unit can then impede IT strategic agility. Centralizing infrastructure governance alone will not enhance IT strategic agility unless this knowledge separation is overcome. This requires line functions to contribute their business knowledge as an input to IT infrastructure decisions, i.e., a recourse to JM's transmission solution. However, the linguistic chasm between IT and line functions makes it challenging for the line functions to communicate their business knowledge in a form that the IT unit can readily comprehend in making IT infrastructure decisions (Feld and Stoddard 2004, Star and Ruhleder 1996) . A solution, then, is increasing line functions' technical knowledge, which allows them to provide relevant inputs (e.g., function-specific needs and priorities) in a language that the IT unit can more readily understand and apply in making IT infrastructure decisions. Simply increasing the IT unit's business knowledge would not substitute for this because the IT unit is less likely to possess the depth of business knowledge in multiple functional areas. Therefore, IT infrastructure governance centralization will enhance IT strategic agility only in combination with line functions' technical knowledge. Increasing one increases the marginal returns of the other. This represents discriminating alignment between IT infrastructure governance and peripheral knowledge. This leads to our second discriminating alignment hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). An increase in line functions' technical knowledge increases the marginal returns to IT strategic agility from centralizing IT infrastructure governance.
Methodology
Our unit of analysis is the firm's IT function, consistent with prior studies of IT governance (Brown and Magill 1998 , Lu and Ramamurthy 2011 , Sambamurthy et al. 2003 . We collected matched-pair data from senior IT managers and line function managers in 105 U.S. firms to test the proposed ideas. Data on IT strategic agility were collected from line function managers and the remaining variables from IT managers, who were the key informants for our constructs. This partitioned approach was necessary because our study used a matched-pair design and response rates would have suffered from attempting a lengthy matched-pair instrument involving non-IT managers. The sampling frame was a random sample of 800 firms in the Dun & Bradstreet database, of which we sent the survey to management information system (MIS) managers and multiple line function managers in 620 firms where we could either directly precontact via telephone or reach via voicemail. Three follow-ups yielded matched-pair assessments from both an MIS manager and at least one line function manager in 105 firms, for a 16.94% response rate (105/620).
The firms represented a variety of industries including retail, construction, services, and manufacturing. The primary respondents were highly experienced (average IT experience in the firm was 7.3 years). On average, the firms invested 5.05% (SD, 4.45) of their annual revenues on IT, and employed 34 (SD, 80.6) individuals in the IT unit and 519 (SD, 907) employees in total. Thirty-four percent of the firms were public. Furthermore, T -tests comparing the early (first 32) and late (last 32) respondents on the principal constructs revealed no evidence for nonresponse bias (IT infrastructure centralization, t = 1 59; IT app decentralization, t = −0 75; IT business knowledge, t = 0 34; line technical knowledge, t = 1 43; IT unit performance, t = 0 80; IT strategic agility, t = 1 21; all nonsignificant (n.s.)).
Construct Operationalization and
Scale Development We measured all principal constructs using reflective multi-item Likert scales using the firm's IT function as the unit of analysis. New scales were developed for two of the model's key theoretical constructs, IT app and IT infrastructure governance, and the rest were adapted (see Appendix A). Descriptions of firm-level decisions pertaining to IT apps and IT infrastructure in the extant literature were used as a starting point for scale development (Baschab and Piot 2003 , Ross 2002 , Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999 , Star and Ruhleder 1996 , Weill and Ross 2004 . We refined the preliminary item pool via interviews with a convenience sample of 11 IT managers and six academic experts. This ensured that the scale items clearly captured the theoretical domain of each construct and were meaningful in the broad pool of sampled industries.
Following prior research (Brown 1999 , Brown and Magill 1994 , Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999 , IT governance centralization and decentralization were used as end points of the continuum and referred respectively to the degree to which the authority over an IT decision leaned toward the IT unit or the line functions. We assume that, irrespective of which department makes IT decisions, the IT unit implements them. IT app governance decentralization used four items that assessed the degree to which the primary responsibility for decisions about app planning, initiating new projects, managing key projects, and app development activities resided to a greater degree with the line functions vis-à-vis the IT unit. IT infrastructure governance centralization used four items that assessed the degree to which the primary responsibility for decisions about IT communications and networking, IT operations and maintenance, procurement of hardware/software, and end-user support resided to a greater degree with the IT unit vis-à-vis the line functions. IT unit's business knowledge used six items based on prior measures Benbasat 2004, Tiwana and Konsynski 2010) that assessed the extent to which members of the IT unit understood the firm's day-to-day business routines, business rules and heuristics, business opportunities and threats, business strategy, and had a holistic understanding of its business. Line functions' technical knowledge used seven items that assessed the extent to which the line function managers understood systems design, database structures, programming languages, IT project methodologies, software testing and debugging, data processing procedures, and application development tools, informed by prior scales (see Bassellier et al. 2003, Tiwana and Konsynski 2010) . We used MIS managers as key informants for three reasons. Collecting these data from line managers (a) was infeasible because it would have required matched responses from many line functions in each firm, (b) they would have been poor informants of line functions other than their own, and (c) they would have been even more vulnerable to self-reporting bias. We focused on IT managers perceptions about line managers because (a) they are more likely to interact with line managers (the key decision makers with authority in line functions) across the firm and (b) managers in individual line functions are unlikely to be good informants about all (potentially thousands) employees in other functional departments. The scale is therefore a reasonable proxy for line functions' technical knowledge. The adapted scales were refined to be generalizable to the broad swath of industries in our sampling frame, based on feedback from our expert panel. IT strategic agility was adapted from Segars and Grover's (1998) strategic information systems (IS) "planning alignment success" measure that tapped into the line function managers' assessment of the degree to which their firm's IT unit had been successful in identifying IT opportunities to support the firm's strategic direction, educating top management on the importance of IT, assessing the strategic importance of emerging technologies, and adapting technology to changing business needs. (Four of their items held up in the factor analysis, narrowing the meaning of our measured construct.) Their conceptualization of this construct was the firm's success in deploying IT that was congruent with the firm's evolving strategic needs, which is conceptually similar but broader than IT strategic agility. The items and sources for the controls and instrumental variables appear in Appendix A. Table 3 summarizes correlations, scale reliability, means, and standard deviations. The acceptable Cronbach 's (≥0 79) and eigenvalues (>2 1) provide the first assurance that the scales had high convergent validity. The Varimax-rotated exploratory factor analysis (EFA) matrix in Appendix B further shows that the loadings of each indicator on the corresponding theoretical construct exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.6 and had low cross loadings (<0 3). Overall, this suggests psychometric adequacy.
Psychometric Properties
Analysis and Results
Endogeneity in Firms' IT Governance Choices
It is erroneous to view IT governance as a property firms have rather than choose. Almost all prior studies, however, treat IT governance as exogenous (e.g., Tiwana and Konsynski 2010, Xue et al. 2008) . To isolate the proposed theoretical relationships, we must first econometrically account for factors that drive firms' IT governance choices but do not directly affect IT strategic agility. Not accounting for endogeneity assumes that firms' IT governance choices are random rather than rational choices. Recognizing IT governance endogeneity also means that we eschew any assertions about normatively ideal IT governance structures (e.g., the pervasive assertion that centralization is optimal for IT infrastructure and decentralization for IT app governance).
Our analyses must econometrically account for three sources of endogeneity in IT governance: (a) selection effects due to omitted variable bias, (b) existing knowledge integration mechanisms already in place to facilitate JM's transmission solution independent of peripheral knowledge, and (c) reverse causality (i.e., IT performance causing changes in IT governance structure).
First, three sets of drivers of IT governance choice observed in prior IT governance studies must be accounted for before any attempts to explain its consequences. These include (a) the strategic roles of IT for a firm, (b) properties of the firm's internal organization, and (c) properties of the firm's external environment. Strategic roles of IT include the strategic importance of IT to the firm (Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999), premising that greater strategic importance of IT will encourage firms to centralize IT decisions, and potential for cross-unit IT synergies that encourage centralizing IT decisions Magill 1998, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . Internal properties include IT formalization, with the rationale that greater formalization will lead firms to increase centralization of IT decisions, and IT unit size, with the rationale that larger IT units are more likely to be centralized to ensure coordination (Brown 1997, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) . External environmental properties include industry dynamism, because firms in more dynamic industries are less likely to centralize IT decisions (Brown 1997) , and uncertainty, premising that greater uncertainty about IT needs will lead firms to decentralize IT decisions (Hann and Weber 1996) . Information intensity and departmental interdependence do not affect IT governance choice (Brown 1997 ) and were therefore not included. Firms thus choose how much to centralize IT governance based on the strategic role of IT in their business model, their internal structure, and the firm's external environment. Our model therefore culminates on the vast prior literature on IT governance choices. Second, it is naive to assume that firms will not have anticipated the knowledge separation problem potentially addressed by JM's transmission solution and already accounted for it in their IT governance choices. This requires accounting for knowledge integration mechanisms already in place in a firm that might serve as alternatives to peripheral knowledge to realize JM's transmission solution. We therefore use two instruments: the degree to which a firm actively scans and integrates knowledge (a) from outside its boundaries in its IT activities (external knowledge integration) and (b) across departments within the firm (internal knowledge integration; Alonso et al. 2008 , Mitchell 2006 , Reich and Benbasat 2000 .
Third, we must acknowledge the defining role that past IT performance might have played in shaping current IT governance. Firms are likely to attempt to correct performance shortfalls or reinforce strong IT unit performance by further tweaking IT governance structures. IT unit performance can therefore lead to reallocation of authority over IT decisions; this historical reverse-causal explanation must directly be considered. We therefore use it as an instrument.
4.1.1. Econometric Modeling Approach for Endogenizing IT Governance. The solution to account for endogeneity is Garen's (1984) two-stage econometric technique. Unlike two-stage least squares (2SLS; which also produced consistent results), this approach permits us to model unobserved heterogeneity over a range of IT governance choices and also allows drawing more nuanced theoretical inferences. Our analysis first accounted for IT governance endogeneity (Stage 1) and then tested the hypotheses (Stage 2). In Stage 1, we estimated two reducedform "IT governance choice models" (Equations (1) and (2)) to construct endogeneity-correcting s for both IT app and infrastructure governance, which are included in the subsequent "strategic agility model" (Equations (3)- (5)).
Analysis
4.2.1. Stage 1: IT Governance Choice Model and Endogeneity Correction s. We first evaluated whether endogeneity was a concern in our model using the Hausman (1978) endogeneity test. The results suggested that IT app decentralization was endogenous (Hausman t = 1 94, p < 0 05), but IT infrastructure centralization was not endogenous (Hausman t = 0 43, n.s.). For consistency, we account for endogeneity in both models. (Appendix C demonstrates how failure to endogenize leads to misleading conclusions.)
In this stage, we first estimated the endogenous variables-IT app governance decentralization and IT infrastructure governance centralization-and their residuals ( app and inf ) using the two governance choice equations, (1) and (2). As instruments, we used (a) the six predictors of IT governance choice spanning strategic, internal, and environmental drivers from prior studies; (b) internal and external knowledge integration mechanisms; and (c) IT unit performance. Their definitions and guiding sources appear in Table 1 . Stage 1 (Equations (1) and (2)) results appear in Table 4 
The results in Table 4 show that the models for both IT app decentralization and IT infrastructure centralization are significant, and that firms systematically choose their IT governance based on the strategic importance of IT to the firm, potential for cross-unit IT synergies, level of IT formalization, uncertainty, and preexistence of external knowledge integration mechanisms. 7 However, firms' IT governance choices are not shaped by industry dynamism, IT unit size, internal knowledge integration, or IT unit performance.
Stage 2:
IT Strategic Agility Model Accounting for IT Governance Endogeneity. Our conceptualization of discriminating alignment corresponds to alignment-as-interaction in Venkatraman's (1989) framework, which is appropriate when alignment has high theoretical specificity and is anchored to a specific criterion variable (IT strategic agility) predicted by the interaction between a small number of variables (IT governance and peripheral knowledge). Interaction terms are therefore used to test the two hypotheses.
We tested the hypotheses using a three-step hierarchical weighted least squares (WLS) model with app as a source variable in Stage 2. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is inefficient because of heteroskedasticity caused by the dependence of the second stage error term on the governance choice variables (Garen 1984) . WLS mitigates the subsequent risk of inefficient standard errors affecting significance tests.
In this stage, controls were added to the model (Step 1 in Table 5 ), then the main effects, and app and inf from Stage 1, and the two product terms described 7 Although the drivers appear to push IT governance in conflicting directions in the "conflicting contingencies" view Magill 1998, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) , our Stage 1 results paint a more nuanced picture when the IT governance concept is decomposed into IT app and IT infrastructure governance; there is limited overlap in the drivers of the two classes of decision rights, and the ones that influence both push them in opposite directions.
below (
Step 2), and finally the mean-centered interaction terms ( Step 3) to test the hypotheses (shaded cells in Table 5 ) ( app is from Equation (1) and inf is from Equation (2)). We centered the interaction terms to minimize multicollinearity; the highest variance inflation factor was 5.02 in Step 3. Note that we use the predicted values of IT app and IT infrastructure governance in Stage 2 (indicated byŷ, following Garen 1984) . By using predicted rather than observed values of IT governance choices, our model does not presume any normatively ideal IT governance structure (e.g., that app decisions ought to be decentralized and infrastructure decisions centralized (e.g., Magill 1994, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) ). The stepwise model in Equations (3)-(5) was used to estimate IT strategic agility with the results in Table 5 ; the model was significant in the second and the third steps IT strategic agility Table 5 Stage 2 (IT Strategic Agility Model; WLS): Effects of Governance-Knowledge Alignment on IT Strategic Agility While Accounting for Endogeneity
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
The values obtained from Stage 1 are included in Stage 2 to account for endogeneity while performing the hypothesis tests. The product terms of the s with the predicted values of the two IT governance variables are also included to account for unobserved heterogeneity across the range of centralization/decentralization choices for the two classes of IT governance; their coefficients indicate the direction of the endogeneity bias (Garen 1984 (Garen , p. 1214 .
In Table 5 , the interaction effect between app andŷ app_decentralization (Step 3) is significant ( = 0 34, t-value = 2.60, p < 0 01) in the full model. This reveals the advantages of decentralizing IT app governance as well as the penalties of centralizing it. It implies that IT strategic agility suffers in firms that decentralize IT app governance to a lesser degree than predicted. By contrast, the corresponding term for IT infrastructure centralization is nonsignificant, suggesting that there is no unobserved heterogeneity over the range of IT infrastructure governance choices.
Our two hypotheses are tested in Step 3. 8 The interaction between IT unit business knowledge and y app_decentralization was positive and significant ( = 0 41, t-value = 2.48, p < 0 01), supporting Hypothesis 1. The interaction between line functions' technical knowledge andŷ infrastructure_centralization was positive and significant ( = 0 21, t-value = 1.90, p < 0 05), supporting Hypothesis 2. The nonsignificant interaction of the two peripheral knowledge variables suggests that, by itself, symmetrically shared knowledge between departments does not enhance strategic agility ( = 0 05, t-value = 0 35). Furthermore, the nonsignificance of the two nonfocal interaction terms suggest that neither greater business knowledge in the IT unit nor greater technical knowledge in the line functions respectively compensate for discriminating peripheral knowledge for IT infrastructure and IT app governance. The model explained 43.3% (31.8% adjusted) of the variance in IT strategic agility, of which the interactions including discriminating alignment account for 23% (20% adjusted) of the explained variance. This explained variance, although substantial on its own, also signals considerable opportunity to theoretically expand the nomological network beyond our discriminating alignment explanation.
To assess sample size adequacy, we analyzed effect size and power at the 5% and 1% levels. The R 2 increment due to the addition of interaction terms 8 Iacobucci (2008, p. 48) emphasizes that when the focus of the tests is on the interaction effects (as in our hypotheses), the significance of the main effects is not of substantive interest. Therefore, the hypothesis tests do not require the main effects to be significant; nor does our theory. has a power of 0.99 at = 0 05 and 0.96 at = 0 01. The sample size required for the standard threshold of power of 0.80 is 50 at = 0 05 and 67 at = 0 01. Our sample size exceeds these requirements. The value of effect size (f 2 ) is 0.33, which approximates a large (f 2 > 0 35) Cohen effect size. Assessment of rival explanations. Since no prior empirical precursors exist for strategic agility as they do for IT governance choice, we used a conservative approach of not reusing any of our nine instrumental variables as controls for rival explanations. (Adding the nonsignificant instruments as control variables did not substantively change the results.) The only control variable we used for the second stage was IT intensity on the premise that firms investing a greater proportion of revenues in IT will be better equipped to strategically deploy IT more rapidly (Baschab and Piot 2003, p. 48; Hann and Weber 1996) .
Econometric Robustness Tests
We used the following econometric robustness tests:
1. Validity of model overidentifying restrictions. We used Bassman's (1960) test for overidentifying restrictions. The Bassman f (0.39; p = 0 82) was nonsignificant, indicating that the model was appropriately overidentified.
2. Instrument sufficiency tests. We used Anderson and Rubin's (1949) test, whose null is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the equation. The AndersonRubin 2 was 2.00 (p = 0 73; n.s.) suggesting that the set of instruments used in our model are valid and sufficient. A Sargan test ( 2 = 4 75; p = 0 31, n.s.) also independently confirmed the adequacy of our instruments.
3. 2SLS and WLS robustness. To ensure robustness of our findings across estimation methods, we replicated the strategic agility model using (a) 2SLS and (b) WLS with inf as an alternative source variable. Both hypotheses were consistently supported.
4. Selective endogeneity correction robustness. Since the Hausman (1978) test did not indicate endogeneity in IT infrastructure governance as it did for app governance, we replicated the analysis without inf in Stage 2 of the Garen procedure. The results strongly supported both discriminating alignment hypotheses (H1, = 0 39, t-value = 2.43, p < 0 01; H2, = 0 20, t-value = 1.78, p < 0 05), and other coefficients remained consistent with Table 5. 5. Model robustness without reverse causality and common methods bias. We reestimated the model without IT performance as an instrument in Stage 1. All hypotheses were supported (H1, = 0 45, t-value = 2.73, p < 0 01; H2, = 0 25, t-value = 2.09, p < 0 05), and the significance for the remaining coefficients was consistent with the reported results. Overall, this indicates that the results are robust. We also failed to find evidence of common methods bias. 
Limitations
The results should be interpreted cognizant of three limitations. First, our cross-sectional data cannot test causation. Even though matched-pair data were used, line functions' technical knowledge is measured as the IT manager's perception of the construct. Collecting these data from many line managers in each firm was infeasible. Second, we did not explicitly control for firms' outsourcing levels. Third, caution should be exercised in extrapolating the results to larger or smaller firms, given the midsized firms in the study. For example, would ERP systems more common in large firms constitute IT infrastructure as we view them or IT apps? To assess whether firm size systematically biases our results, we included firm size (only available for the 36 public firms in the data set) in both stages of our model. It was nonsignificant as an instrument (suggesting that firm size does not influence IT governance choice) and as a control (suggesting that larger or smaller firms are not systematically different in their IT strategic agility). 10 The correlation between firm size and strategic agility was also nonsignificant ( = −0 04; t = −0 21, n.s.). Therefore, we failed to find evidence that the results would not generalize beyond the midsized firms in our study.
Discussion
Our study was motivated by the increasingly strategic role of IT but inattention to how firms can govern IT to be strategic. Although over $4 trillion are spent annually on IT, some firms like Zara, Walmart, and Delta Air Lines strategically exploit IT better than their rivals. Prior IT governance studies have focused primarily on explaining firms' IT governance choices (e.g., centralization versus decentralization), rather than their downstream strategic consequences. Our understanding of how firms' multifaceted IT governance choices shape IT strategic agility thus remains embryonic, even though firms aspire to it (e.g., Hann 9 Although our multi-informant design mitigates common methods bias, we conducted two additional tests. First, the marker variable test (using the theoretically unrelated public firm dummy and survey identifier number as the two marker variables) showed average correlations of 0.24 (n.s.) and 0.11 (n.s.) with the principal constructs. Second, a single-factor test showed no single dominant factor in the EFA in Appendix B (the first factor explained 10.5% of the total 79.4% variance). 10 We also added firm size as a control variable (which was not included in Table 5 due to missing data for private firms) and obtained consistent results (H1, = 0 47, t-value = 2.30, p < 0 05; H2, = 0 32, t-value = 2.08, p < 0 05). Using firm size as an instrument and both as an instrument and control yielded consistent results. and Weber 1996, Sambamurthy et al. 2003, Segars and Grover 1998) . Our premise was that differences in how IT activities are governed within firms can help explain differences in IT strategic agility across them. Our middle-range theory developed the idea that firms' IT governance choices foster IT strategic agility only when their alignment with departments' peripheral knowledge is discriminating-discriminating in that only a specific department's peripheral knowledge induces agility for a specific class (apps or infrastructure) of IT decisions; which department has peripheral knowledge must be aligned with which department makes what IT decisions. Noteworthy in our theory development are decomposition of predominantly monolithic conceptualizations of IT governance and incorporation of known explanations of IT governance choice in our econometric analyses. Tests of the proposed ideas using matched-pair data from 105 firms have two substantive theoretical implications for both the IT governance literature and broader organization theory.
Contributions and Theoretical Implications
5.1.1. Discriminating Alignment. Our distinctive contribution is that IT governance enhances IT strategic agility only when it is discriminatingly aligned with departments' peripheral knowledge. We used a singular theoretical apparatus for both classes of IT decisions. Moving decision rights to the locus of relevant knowledge (JM's delegation solution) minimizes agility-impeding delays from interdepartmental knowledge transfer. IT apps and infrastructure rely primarily on different types of knowledge concentrated in different departments, so JM's delegation solution nudges them in opposite directions on the centralization-decentralization continuum.
11 However, nudging IT app governance toward decentralization and IT infrastructure governance toward centralization also separates them from dispersed complementary knowledge that either needs. This requires a tandem use of JM's transmission solution, which peripheral knowledge facilitates. Discriminatingly aligned peripheral knowledge in the IT unit and line functions then respectively increase the marginal returns to IT strategic agility from a firm's governance choices for IT apps and infrastructure.
This finding has two implications for the IT governance literature. First, firms' demand that IT activities simultaneously be economical yet fine-tuned to line functions' strategic needs appears hopelessly contradictory and unrealistic (Cramm 2010, p. 107; Feld and Stoddard 2004) . This dreaded tension might simply be an artifact of confounding the two classes of IT assets in theory. It vaporizes when we theoretically disaggregate the pervasive monolithic conception of IT governance into two distinctly governed classes of IT decisions. Such bifurcation permits simultaneous pursuit of two seemingly contradictory demands: Firms can govern IT infrastructure to realize scale economies and focus IT apps on the myriad line functions' diverse needs. Appreciating what is being governed must therefore precede the quest for the Holy Grail of "good" IT governance. Figure 3 illustrates discriminating alignment. Figure 3(a) shows that decentralizing IT app governance enhances IT strategic agility only when the IT unit's 11 Prior studies' inconsistent use of IT governance to refer to just one class of IT decisions (e.g., Brown and Magill 1998 , Brown 1997 , Olson and Chervany 1980 peripheral knowledge is high (the solid line; +1 SD), but not when it is low (the dotted line; −1 SD). Thus, contrary to admonitions to decentralize IT app governance (Cramm 2010, p. 25; Heller 2012, p. 105; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 75) , decentralization alone is impotent unless the IT unit has greater peripheral knowledge. Figure 3(b) shows that centralizing IT infrastructure governance enhances IT strategic agility only when the line functions' peripheral knowledge is high (the solid line), but not when it is low (the dotted line). Sambamurthy and Zmud's (1999) caution that line functions lacking technical knowledge will be unprepared for IT decentralization thus applies primarily to IT infrastructure governance. This implies that only in a nuanced combination are IT governance and peripheral knowledge powerful enablers of IT strategic agility, revealing the inseparability of the previously unconnected research streams on firms' IT governance choices (e.g., Magill 1994, 1998; Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) and IT-line shared knowledge (e.g., Bassellier et al. 2003 , Nelson and Cooprider 1996 , Reich and Benbasat 2000 .
The merits of granularizing IT governance into apps and infrastructure remained invisible until we developed their theoretical properties, even though the conceptual distinction is widespread (e.g., Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002 , Ross 2002 , Weill and Ross 2005 . Such disaggregation by itself induces IT strategic agility (indicated by the significant infrastructure × apps product term in Step 3 in Table 5 ; = 0 18, p < 0 05). Thus, centralizing one class of IT decisions amplifies the benefits from decentralizing the other. Lumping them under the rubric of IT governance penalizes agility by unnecessarily forcing firms to covary them. This is illustrated by the 2 × 2 heat map in Figure 4 , which uses four median-split subgroups representing high and low levels of delegation of IT app and infrastructure governance. Delegation in this heat map is as predicted by our theory and respectively represents centralization of IT infrastructure and decentralization of IT app governance. Three inferences can be drawn from the patterns in this heat map.
• Complete centralization or decentralization. Centralizing all IT decisions (the lower right cell; 5.31) outperforms only decentralizing all of them (upper left cell; 5.02). IT strategic agility is most penalized when firms delegate app decisions (i.e., decentralize them) but not infrastructure (i.e., do not centralize it). This implies that decentralizing all IT governance is the worst possible approach to governing IT assets in terms of IT strategic agility. The pattern illustrated jointly by the top left and bottom right cells is that firms are worse off when they delegate one class of IT decisions but not the other.
• Centralizing one class of IT decisions and decentralizing the other class. Any more nuanced approach to governing IT outperforms a completely centralized or completely decentralized approach, as illustrated by the bottom left and top right cells of Figure 4 . Put differently, not covarying IT app governance and IT infrastructure governance is associated with higher levels of IT strategic agility.
• A discriminating approach to governing IT assets. A discriminating alignment approach (top right cell of Figure 4 ; 5.84) posited by our theory outperforms a nondiscriminating approach (bottom left cell; 5.52). Delegation of both classes of IT decisions therefore results in the highest IT strategic agility. The small difference across IT strategic agility across the top right and bottom left cells can potentially culminate over time into larger competitive differences due to the path-dependent nature of technology evolution.
For example, consider how Coca-Cola disaggregates IT app from IT infrastructure governance to foster strategic agility. The IT app embedded in Coke's innovative 125-flavor Freestyle soda dispensers collects sales data on individual Coke brands at each location. This allows leasing stores to alter the product mix at individual stores multiple times a day, using analytics data provided by Coke. However, Coke is able to economically leverage the app for real-time market experiments only because a robust, centralized IT infrastructure also seamlessly integrates apps embedded in the geographically dispersed dispensers to Coke's analytics group in Atlanta. Coke's IT governance approach puts it squarely in the upper right cell in Figure 4 .
Second, endogenizing historically exogenized IT governance choices also reveals insights into the consequences of IT governance over-and undercentralization, besides building on the vast IT governance choice literature without presuming any normative ideal. Note that the endogeneity of IT app decentralization is a conditional effect because app is nonsignificant in Step 2 but its interaction term is significant in Step 3 in Table 5 . This conditional effect implies that firms are better off erring towards over-decentralizing rather than over-centralizing IT app governance because the former amplifies the effect of that choice on IT strategic agility. No such inference can be drawn about IT infrastructure governance.
For the broader literature on organization design (e.g., Alonso et al. 2008 , Athey and Roberts 2001 , Dessein et al. 2010 , this finding offers new insights into how the underused lever of decision rights allocation can resolve an enduring tension in organizing functional activities. The tension is between centralization's advantage of firmwide synergies and decentralization's advantage of being functionally bespoken (Dessein et al. 2010) . Separating decision rights into two theoretically distinguishable classes with primarily firmwide consequences vis-à-vis departmental consequences-as illustrated by IT infrastructure and apps here-permits the same department to achieve firmwide synergy where possible without sacrificing functional bespokenness where critical. Our results suggest centralizing functional decisions that affect the entire firm, but decentralizing those that affect only some functions.
Governance-Contingent Value of Peripheral
Knowledge. Our second contribution is moving past a simplistic notion of shared knowledge to show the governance-contingent nature of which department needs peripheral knowledge. Increasing shared knowledge across two departments appears at odds with intrafirm division of labor. It is both distracting and costly because it contradicts departmental specialization and overlooks plausible asymmetry in departmental knowledge overlaps. Our middle-range theory eschews the oversimplified symmetric notion of shared knowledge. Consider an analogy. For the reader to interact with a Japanese person, it is useful to know when the Japanese person must be able to speak English and when you must be able to speak Japanese; the benefits of both becoming bilingual might not be commensurate with costs. This is exactly what increasing shared knowledge between IT and line functions entails.
The implication for the IT governance literature is that the department that needs to speak the other's language depends on which department makes what IT decisions. The benefits of a particular department's peripheral knowledge are governance contingent. By contrast, prior studies overlook a firm's IT governance choices in encouraging increasing business acumen of IT staff (Bassellier and Benbasat 2004; Heller 2012, p. 94) , line managers' IT skills (Bassellier et al. 2003, Weill and Aral 2006) , and shared knowledge between IT and line functions (Nelson and Cooprider 1996; Ross 2002; Weill and Ross 2004, p. 68) . The value of shared knowledge is discriminating, not unconditional. Our results also imply that the IT unit's business knowledge by itself is more important than previously recognized (note its positive main effect in Table 5 ), unlike line functions' technical knowledge, whose benefits depend entirely on their possession of IT app decision rights. Firms fare better erring toward overinvesting in increasing the IT unit's business knowledge but underinvesting in line functions' technical knowledge, as the post hoc analyses in Appendix D further illustrate.
This offers a new insight for broader organization theory that recognizes the necessity of specialization for productive intrafirm division of labor even though it breeds ignorance across departments (Becker and Murphy 1992, Jensen and Meckling 1992) . Ignorance itself can be a valuable asset worth protecting (Tiwana 2008) . Our results imply that firms can selectively reduce cross-departmental ignorance just enough to conduce collaboration without imperiling departmental specialization.
Our findings raise three questions that merit future research. First, firms appear to lag in correcting IT unit underperformance by reorganizing IT governance (performance → IT governance reverse causality was absent); how can they reduce this lag? Second, what intervening mechanisms-treated as a black box in our theory-help explain the link between discriminating alignment and IT strategic agility? Third, the interplay of IT apps with IT infrastructure is theoretically uncharted. If a firm's IT portfolio were envisioned metaphorically as a pizza, IT infrastructure is the crust and IT apps its toppings. It is the apps that competitively differentiate one firm's IT portfolio from another's, just as toppings differentiate one pizza from another. IT infrastructure-like a pizza's crust-never substantively differentiates. Yet, a good enough IT infrastructure is a necessary foundation to run these apps, just as a good enough crust is needed for a pizza.
In conclusion, our middle-range theory of discriminating IT governance scratches only the surface in shifting attention from monolithic toward more multifaceted conceptions of IT governance. As firms invest an expanding proportion of their capital into IT, IT managers' ability to translate these investments into a strategic advantage is increasingly inseparable from their prosperity.
Appendix A. Measures
The respondents were instructed that line functions referred to non-IT departments of their organization, such as sales, purchasing, manufacturing, human resources, accounting, and finance. Scale end-point anchors were 1, strongly disagree, and 7, strongly agree, unless noted otherwise. Items dropped during scale refinement are indicated by an asterisk.
IT app governance decentralization was measured using four items that tapped into how decision-making responsibilities for the following IS activities were distributed in the organization: (1) applications planning, (2) initiating new projects, (3) managing key projects, and (4) application development activities. The anchors were as follows: 1, fully vested with IS unit; 4, shared between IS unit and line functions; 7, fully vested with various line functions.
IT infrastructure governance centralization was measured using four items that tapped into how decision-making responsibilities for the following IS activities were distributed in the organization: (1) communications and networking, (2) IT operations and maintenance, (3) procurement of hardware/software, and (4) end-user support. The anchors were as follows: 1, fully vested with various line functions; 4, shared between IS unit and line functions; 7, fully vested with IS unit.
IT unit's business knowledge was measured using six items that tapped into the overall extent to which members of the IT unit understood the following about the organization:
(1) its day-to-day business routines, (2) business rules and heuristics, (3) business opportunities and threats, (4) the company's business strategy, (5) a "big picture" of the company's business, and (6) a holistic understanding of the company's business. The anchors were as follows: 1, not at all; 4, somewhat; 7, to a great extent.
Line functions' technical knowledge was measured using seven items that tapped into the overall extent to which the company's line managers understood the following: (1) systems design, (2) database structures, (3) programming languages, (4) IT project methodologies, (5) software testing and debugging, (6) data processing procedures, and (7) application development tools. The anchors were as follows: 1, not at all; 4, somewhat; 7, to a great extent.
IT strategic agility was measured using four items from Segars and Grover's (1998) strategic IS scale that tapped into the extent to which the IT unit had been successful in accomplishing the following: (1) identifying IT opportunities to support the strategic direction of the firm, (2) educating top management on the importance of IT, (3) assessing the strategic importance of emerging technologies, and (4) adapting technology to changing business needs. Dropped items were (5) coordinating IT initiatives in various departments * , (6) identifying and resolving potential sources of resistance to IT plans * , (7) maintaining open lines of communication with other departments * , and (8) avoiding overlapping development of major systems * . Anchors were as follows: 1, very unsuccessful; 7, very successful.
Uncertainty was measured using four items derived from Hann and Weber (1996) that tapped into the degree to which the key activities performed by the IT unit (1) followed a clearly known approach, (2) followed an understandable sequence of steps, (3) relied on established procedures and practices, and (4) were guided by a clearly defined body of knowledge. The anchors were as follows: 1, strongly agree; 7, strongly disagree.
Strategic importance of IT was measured using four items adapted from Hann and Weber (1996) that tapped into the degree to which, in the respondent's organization, information systems (1) were key to competitiveness, (2) critical to business success, (3) were of great strategic importance, (4) served only administrative purposes (reversed) * , and (5) were critical to marketplace adaptability.
Cross-unit IT synergy was measured using four items based on Brown and Magill (1998, p. 182 ) that assessed the extent to which substantial potential benefits exist in centrally coordinating the following across all departments in the organization: (1) programming tools, (2) applications planning * , (3) project management, (4) systems development activities, and (5) systems development resources.
Industry dynamism was measured using three items that tapped into the degree to which (1) the organization's major competitors in its industry were continually devising new strategies, (2) the organization's major competitors in its industry were continually introducing new products, and (3) technological breakthroughs had made possible numerous new products in its industry.
IT formalization was measured using three items adapted from Ranganathan and Sethi (2002) that tapped into the extent to which the IT unit (1) had clearly documented job descriptions for all staff, (2) used task forces and committees to handle critical issues * , (3) used operating rules and procedures for decision making, and (4) extensively relied on standard operating procedures such as rules, policies, and forms.
IT unit performance was measured using four items that assessed how the organization's IT unit generally compared in relation to comparable IT units the respondent had observed in terms of the following in the work that it produced for the organization's line functions: (1) quality, (2) efficiency, (3) timeliness, (4) adherence to budgets * , and (5) overall performance. The end-point anchors were as follows: 1, much worse; 7, much better.
External knowledge integration was measured using three items that assessed the extent to which the IT unit actively utilized information about the following in its ongoing activities: (1) new market developments, (2) new technical developments, (3) emerging technologies, (4) competitors' use of IT * , and (5) ideas from business partners (e.g., suppliers, vendors, distributors)
* . The scale anchors were as follows: 1, not at all; 4, somewhat; 7, to a great extent (new scale).
Internal knowledge integration was measured using three items that assessed the extent to which members of the IT unit and line functions (1) have a shared agenda * , (2) build on each other's ideas, (3) engage in joint problem solving, (4) recognize each other's constraints * , (5) draw on each other's skills and expertise, and (6) have developed a shared understanding about the role of IT in the organization * . The scale anchors were as follows: 1, not at all; 4, somewhat; 7, to a great extent (new scale).
IT unit size was measured by the number of individuals employed in the organization's IT unit.
IT intensity was measured as the percentage of the organization's gross revenue that was allocated to the IT unit. Note. The bold cells highlight factor structure patterns. 
Appendix C. Errors from Neglecting IT Governance Endogeneity
Failing to account for the endogeneity of a firm's IT governance choices results in spurious conclusions, as illustrated by the OLS model in Table C .1, which does not correct for endogeneity and uses observed rather than predicted values of the two IT governance variables. As the shaded cells in the endogeneity-neglecting OLS results in Table C .1 show, the interaction between IT app decentralization and IT infrastructure centralization is nonsignificant ( = −0 00, t-value = −0 02), completely missing the advantages of disaggregating them. They also downplay the importance of the IT unit's business knowledge ( of 0.27 in Table C .1 as opposed to 0.31 in Table 5 , both significant at p < 0 01). This highlights the problem in attempting to study the consequences of IT governance centralization/decentralization without first cumulatively accounting for how the IT governance choice predictors from prior IT governance studies endogenize it.
Appendix D. What Peripheral Knowledge Should Firms Err Toward Overinvesting and Underinvesting in?
Additional slope analysis ( Figure D. 1) suggests that firms should err toward overinvesting in the IT unit's business knowledge and underinvesting in line functions' technical knowledge. In Figure D .1, the dotted line with a steeper slope illustrates that the influence of the IT unit's business knowledge on strategic IT agility is more pronounced when the line functions' technical knowledge is lower than when it is higher (the solid line). Firms are therefore better off erring toward overinvesting in increasing the IT unit's business knowledge while underinvesting in increasing line functions' technical knowledge for enhancing IT strategic agility. 
